Does SendMail Support Outbound TLS Encryption WITHOUT additions to the sendmail.mc file?

7,607

I can confirm that I am seeing the same thing, independently; a sendmail installation with no certificates configured in is still taking advantage of TLS when sending to a server which advertises itself as supporting that protocol.

To see what's going on, I ran a packet capture with tcpdump -n -n -w /tmp/pax.dump port 25 and host 178.18.123.145 on the sending server, then fed that packet dump into wireshark, which told me this:

wireshark analysis of smtp tls conversation

Note how the highlighted packet (no. 17) contains certificate information, as did the packet four prior (no. 13). Packet 13 is the server's certificate, with the chain of trust, and has "Certificates length" of 2327 bytes. This one is the client's certificate, and it has length zero bytes (highlighted line in the packet breakdown window). So I think there's pretty good evidence to suggest that sendmail generates a random keypair for client purposes, and presents it with a zero-length certificate.

If you find this behaviour annoying, as I did, you can turn it off for communications to all hosts by putting

Try_TLS:                NO

in /etc/mail/access and regenerating access.db.

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Mike B
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Mike B

Technology Enthusiast, Gamer, Sci-Fi Addict, and DIY-er in training. =)

Updated on September 18, 2022

Comments

  • Mike B
    Mike B over 1 year

    CentOS 5.x

    Does SendMail support opportunistic TLS "out of the box"?

    I'm used to having to explicitly add the following blurb to /etc/mail/sendmail.mc

    define(`confAUTH_MECHANISMS’, `LOGIN PLAIN’)dnl
    define(`confCACERT_PATH’,`/etc/pki/tls/certs’)dnl
    define(`confCACERT’,` /etc/pki/tls/certs/intermediates.crt’)dnl
    define(`confSERVER_CERT’,` /etc/pki/tls/certs/tls-cert-public.pem’)dnl
    define(`confSERVER_KEY’,` /etc/pki/tls/certs/tls-cert-private.key‘)dnl
    define(`confCLIENT_CERT’,` /etc/pki/tls/certs/tls-cert-public.pem‘)dnl
    define(`confCLIENT_KEY’,` /etc/pki/tls/certs/tls-cert-private.key‘)dnl
    

    However it SEEMS like outbound TLS is working without this having to be there. I notice the following in delivery logs:

    Mar  4 04:36:08 bob sendmail[23831]: q29Ja84u011122: from=<[email protected]>, size=3262, class=0, nrcpts=1, msgid=<[email protected]>, proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=exch.foo.com [192.168.0.1]
    Mar  4 04:36:08 bob sendmail[23834]: STARTTLS=client, relay=mx.remotefoo.com., version=TLSv1/SSLv3, verify=FAIL, cipher=AES128-SHA, bits=128/128
    Mar  4 04:36:08 bob sendmail[23834]: q29Ja84u011122: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=esmtp, pri=123262, relay=mx.remotefoo.com. [12.13.14.15], dsn=4.0.0, stat=Deferred: Connection reset by mx.remotefoo.com.
    

    IP, email addresses, and hostnames have been renamed to protect the innocent. =) The middle line is what confuses me. I would expect to see that only if sendmail actually uses TLS.

    Is this possible? If so, where are the public/private keys that are used for this?

    UPDATE

    I'm revisiting this issue because I'm still curious. Here's the full sendmail.mc (IPs changed to protect the innocent):

    divert(-1)
    #
    # DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE.  It is managed by the appliance node manager
    # or create_smtp_profile script.  Any changes you make may be
    # overwritten.
    #
    divert(0)
    dnl #
    dnl # This is the sendmail macro config file for m4. If you make changes to
    dnl # /etc/mail/sendmail.mc, you will need to regenerate the
    dnl # /etc/mail/sendmail.cf file by confirming that the sendmail-cf package is
    dnl # installed and then performing a
    dnl #
    dnl #     make -C /etc/mail
    dnl #
    include(`/usr/share/sendmail-cf/m4/cf.m4')dnl
    VERSIONID(`setup for linux-gnu')dnl
    OSTYPE(`linux-gnu')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # Disable DNS lookups
    FEATURE(`nocanonify')dnl
    define(`confBIND_OPTS',`-DNSRCH -DEFNAMES')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # default logging level is 9, you might want to set it higher to
    dnl # debug the configuration
    dnl #
    dnl define(`confLOG_LEVEL', `9')dnl
    define(`confLOG_LEVEL', `9')dnl
    
    dnl #
    dnl # Uncomment and edit the following line if your outgoing mail needs to
    dnl # be sent out through an external mail server:
    dnl #
    
    dnl #
    dnl # Uncomment and edit the following line if your incoming mail needs to
    dnl # be sent to an internal mail server:
    dnl #
    dnl define(`MAIL_HUB',`smtp.your.provider')dnl
    dnl FEATURE(`stickyhost')dnl
    dnl #
    define(`confDOMAIN_NAME', `subdomain.support.foo.com')dnl
    define(`confDEF_USER_ID',``8:12'')dnl
    dnl define(`confAUTO_REBUILD')dnl
    define(`confTO_CONNECT', `1m')dnl
    define(`confTRY_NULL_MX_LIST',true)dnl
    define(`confDONT_PROBE_INTERFACES',true)dnl
    define(`PROCMAIL_MAILER_PATH',`/usr/bin/procmail')dnl
    define(`ALIAS_FILE', `/etc/aliases')dnl
    define(`STATUS_FILE', `/var/log/mail/statistics')dnl
    define(`UUCP_MAILER_MAX', `2000000')dnl
    define(`confUSERDB_SPEC', `/etc/mail/userdb.db')dnl
    define(`confPRIVACY_FLAGS', `authwarnings,novrfy,noexpn,restrictqrun')dnl
    define(`confAUTH_OPTIONS', `A')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # The following allows relaying if the user authenticates, and disallows
    dnl # plaintext authentication (PLAIN/LOGIN) on non-TLS links
    dnl #
    dnl define(`confAUTH_OPTIONS', `A p')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # PLAIN is the preferred plaintext authentication method and used by
    dnl # Mozilla Mail and Evolution, though Outlook Express and other MUAs do
    dnl # use LOGIN. Other mechanisms should be used if the connection is not
    dnl # guaranteed secure.
    dnl # Please remember that saslauthd needs to be running for AUTH.
    dnl #
    dnl TRUST_AUTH_MECH(`EXTERNAL DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5 LOGIN PLAIN')dnl
    dnl define(`confAUTH_MECHANISMS', `EXTERNAL GSSAPI DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5 LOGIN PLAIN')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # Rudimentary information on creating certificates for sendmail TLS:
    dnl #     cd /usr/share/ssl/certs; make sendmail.pem
    dnl # Complete usage:
    dnl #     make -C /usr/share/ssl/certs usage
    dnl #
    dnl define(`confCACERT_PATH',`/usr/share/ssl/certs')
    dnl define(`confCACERT',`/usr/share/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt')
    dnl define(`confSERVER_CERT',`/usr/share/ssl/certs/sendmail.pem')
    dnl define(`confSERVER_KEY',`/usr/share/ssl/certs/sendmail.pem')
    dnl #
    dnl # This allows sendmail to use a keyfile that is shared with OpenLDAP's
    dnl # slapd, which requires the file to be readble by group ldap
    dnl #
    dnl define(`confDONT_BLAME_SENDMAIL',`groupreadablekeyfile')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl define(`confTO_QUEUEWARN', `4h')dnl
    dnl define(`confTO_QUEUERETURN', `5d')dnl
    define(`confQUEUE_LA', `50')dnl
    define(`confREFUSE_LA', `50')dnl
    define(`confTO_IDENT', `0')dnl
    dnl FEATURE(delay_checks)dnl
    FEATURE(`no_default_msa',`dnl')dnl
    FEATURE(`smrsh',`/usr/sbin/smrsh')dnl
    FEATURE(`mailertable',`hash -o /etc/mail/mailertable.db')dnl
    FEATURE(`virtusertable',`hash -o /etc/mail/virtusertable.db')dnl
    FEATURE(redirect)dnl
    FEATURE(always_add_domain)dnl
    FEATURE(use_cw_file)dnl
    FEATURE(use_ct_file)dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # The following limits the number of processes sendmail can fork to accept
    dnl # incoming messages or process its message queues to 12.) sendmail refuses
    dnl # to accept connections once it has reached its quota of child processes.
    dnl #
    dnl define(`confMAX_DAEMON_CHILDREN', 12)dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # Limits the number of new connections per second. This caps the overhead
    dnl # incurred due to forking new sendmail processes. May be useful against
    dnl # DoS attacks or barrages of spam. (As mentioned below, a per-IP address
    dnl # limit would be useful but is not available as an option at this writing.)
    dnl #
    dnl define(`confCONNECTION_RATE_THROTTLE', 3)dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # The -t option will retry delivery if e.g. the user runs over his quota.
    dnl #
    FEATURE(local_procmail,`',`procmail -t -Y -a $h -d $u')dnl
    FEATURE(`access_db',`hash -T<TMPF> -o /etc/mail/access.db')dnl
    FEATURE(`blacklist_recipients')dnl
    define(`confDOUBLE_BOUNCE_ADDRESS', `')dnl
    EXPOSED_USER(`root')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # The following causes sendmail to only listen on the IPv4 loopback address
    dnl # 127.0.0.1 and not on any other network devices. Remove the loopback
    dnl # address restriction to accept email from the internet or intranet.
    dnl #
    DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Port=smtp,Addr=127.0.0.1, Name=MTA, InputMailFilters=')dnl
    DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Port=smtp, Addr=192.168.1.1,Name=MTA,Modifiers=b,InputMailFilters=')dnl
    CLIENT_OPTIONS(`Family=inet, Addr=192.168.1.1')dnl
    
    dnl #
    dnl # The following causes sendmail to additionally listen to port 587 for
    dnl # mail from MUAs that authenticate. Roaming users who can't reach their
    dnl # preferred sendmail daemon due to port 25 being blocked or redirected find
    dnl # this useful.
    dnl #
    dnl DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Port=submission, Name=MSA, M=Ea')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # The following causes sendmail to additionally listen to port 465, but
    dnl # starting immediately in TLS mode upon connecting. Port 25 or 587 followed
    dnl # by STARTTLS is preferred, but roaming clients using Outlook Express can't
    dnl # do STARTTLS on ports other than 25. Mozilla Mail can ONLY use STARTTLS
    dnl # and doesn't support the deprecated smtps; Evolution <1.1.1 uses smtps
    dnl # when SSL is enabled-- STARTTLS support is available in version 1.1.1.
    dnl #
    dnl # For this to work your OpenSSL certificates must be configured.
    dnl #
    dnl DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Port=smtps, Name=TLSMTA, M=s')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # The following causes sendmail to additionally listen on the IPv6 loopback
    dnl # device. Remove the loopback address restriction listen to the network.
    dnl #
    dnl DAEMON_OPTIONS(`port=smtp,Addr=::1, Name=MTA-v6, Family=inet6')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # enable both ipv6 and ipv4 in sendmail:
    dnl #
    dnl DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Name=MTA-v4, Family=inet, Name=MTA-v6, Family=inet6')
    dnl #
    dnl # We strongly recommend not accepting unresolvable domains if you want to
    dnl # protect yourself from spam. However, the laptop and users on computers
    dnl # that do not have 24x7 DNS do need this.
    dnl #
    FEATURE(`accept_unresolvable_domains')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl FEATURE(`relay_based_on_MX')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # Also accept email sent to "localhost.localdomain" as local email.
    dnl #
    LOCAL_DOMAIN(`localhost.localdomain')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # The following example makes mail from this host and any additional
    dnl # specified domains appear to be sent from mydomain.com
    dnl #
    dnl MASQUERADE_AS(`mydomain.com')dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # masquerade not just the headers, but the envelope as well
    dnl #
    dnl FEATURE(masquerade_envelope)dnl
    dnl #
    dnl # masquerade not just @mydomainalias.com, but @*.mydomainalias.com as well
    dnl #
    dnl FEATURE(masquerade_entire_domain)dnl
    dnl #
    dnl MASQUERADE_DOMAIN(localhost)dnl
    dnl MASQUERADE_DOMAIN(localhost.localdomain)dnl
    dnl MASQUERADE_DOMAIN(mydomainalias.com)dnl
    dnl MASQUERADE_DOMAIN(mydomain.lan)dnl
    
    
    
    MAILER(smtp)dnl
    MAILER(procmail)dnl
    

    I also collected a packet capture and confirmed that the server is indeed initiating TLS connections to the external party.

    UPDATE #2

    I cranked logging all the way up (99) and sent a test message to a gmail account. I am noticing interesting details:

    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: r56Jsk7N001660: SMTP outgoing connect on foobox.foo.com
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS: ClientCertFile missing
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS: ClientKeyFile missing
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS: CACertPath missing
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS: CACertFile missing
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS: CRLFile missing
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=client, init=1
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=client, start=ok
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=client, info: fds=10/9, err=2
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=client, info: fds=10/9, err=2
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=client, get_verify: 20 get_peer: 0x8907258
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=client, relay=gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com., version=TLSv1/SSLv3, verify=FAIL, cipher=RC4-SHA, bits=128/128
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=client, cert-subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Mountain+20View/O=Google+20Inc/CN=mx.google.com, cert-issuer=/C=US/O=Google+20Inc/CN=Google+20Internet+20Authority, verifymsg=unable to get local issuer certificate
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=read, info: fds=10/9, err=2
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox last message repeated 3 times
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=write, info: fds=10/9, err=3
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox last message repeated 3 times
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: STARTTLS=read, info: fds=10/9, err=2
    Jun  6 12:55:10 foobox sendmail[1663]: r56Jsk7N001660: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:07, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=esmtp, pri=120015, relay=gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com. [74.125.129.27], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (OK 198738510 s9si492345031pan.259 - gsmtp)
    
    • MadHatter
      MadHatter about 12 years
      Could we see evidence that TLS is working without it?
    • Mike B
      Mike B about 12 years
      @MadHatter Excellent question. I updated the post to include the log discrepancy I'm noticing.
    • MadHatter
      MadHatter about 12 years
      Fair enough, I'm convinced. Could we also see the output of egrep "^O.*(Cert|Key)" sendmail.cf (I'm assuming you'll run it against your live sendmail.cf, wherever that is).
    • Mike B
      Mike B almost 11 years
      @MadHatter Nada when I check for that.
    • Mike B
      Mike B almost 11 years
      I added additional logging. My best guess is that in the absence of having certs to exchange, SendMail just uses the public key from the remote side and implicitly trusts it.
  • Mike B
    Mike B almost 11 years
    I don't think so. I checked the file creation dates and both cf and mc match. I restarted the service for good measure to regenerate it.
  • Mike B
    Mike B almost 11 years
    Thanks. That's EXACTLY what I needed to know. The universe makes sense again.